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THE UNWRITTEN FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Anthony J. Sebok*

INTRODUCTION
The historical roots of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) cast a
long shadow over contemporary controversies in arbitration law and
policy. Many excellent scholars extensively covered the complex history and meaning behind the FAA’s passage.1
Regardless of the specific content of that history, its cumulative effect has been that most controversies about arbitration obsess over
the conflict between “arbitration” and some body of law outside of
arbitration, usually in the form of federal judges supplanting their authority for arbitrators or (and more recently) state or federal law limiting the scope of arbitration. In the latter case, critics of arbitration
have turned to various doctrines, such as state contract law’s unconscionability doctrine2 or federal law’s vindication of rights doctrine,3
to cabin the reach of arbitration.
The connection between the FAA’s early history and the conflict
between arbitration and nonarbitration has jurisprudential roots in
the now discredited idea that legal processes had to possess a certain
form for them to qualify as law at all, and that form was the classic
formalist conception of adjudication before a court under the control
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
1. See, e.g., Imre Szalai, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS
IN AMERICA 179–85, 188–89 (2013); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural
Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1946–53 (2014); Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2943–44,
2949–51 (2015); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969–94 (1999).
2. See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (2012); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 91, 107–13 (2012). But see Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion:
Why Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP.
RESOL. 225.
3. See, e.g., Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375 (2014); Ramona L. Lampley,
The Price of Justice: An Analysis of the Costs That Are Appropriately Considered in a Cost-Based
Vindication of Statutory Rights Defense to an Arbitration Agreement, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 825;
Rebecca Wolf, “To a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail”: The Supreme Court’s Misapplication of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 951, 971–92
(2013).
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of a judge and in the hands of lawyers. As recent scholarship has
noted, the Progressive Movement, which was closely connected with
jurisprudential critiques of formalism, had a hand in promoting arbitration in the early twentieth century.4 It is ironic that so many modern skeptics of the current state of arbitration are on the liberal side of
the political spectrum and are associated with positions that can be
traced back to legal realism and the rise of the New Deal.5 Although
much of the legislative pressure for the adoption of the FAA came
from commercial lawyers and business elites, it should not be forgotten that much of the intellectual support that was invoked to advocate
for it came from legal scholars who believed that a broader definition
of law—one that encompassed more than adjudication in a courtroom—could help bring the benefits of the rule of law to economically
and politically disadvantaged parts of society, such as workers and
consumers.6
This Article argues that the roots of arbitration, which are planted
in a jurisprudence that takes many different sources of law, including
a state’s own public policy, seriously, are worth recalling in an era
when the U.S. Supreme Court has aggressively protected arbitration
from any erosion caused by the forces of nonarbitration. Others have
vigorously argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a number of
wrong turns in its interpretation of the FAA’s scope, and this Article
cannot, and does not, pretend to add to those claims or even try to
evaluate them. This Article’s goal is more modest: arguing that within
the FAA’s sweep, there is room for states to combat the suppression
of arbitration by demanding that some contracts (e.g., consumer contracts of adhesion) be “pro-arbitration” by prohibiting assignment and
consolidation waivers.
II.

AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION

In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,7 the plaintiff–consumers
claimed that AT&T Mobility, their cellular phone service provider,
engaged in consumer fraud when it charged them $30 in sales tax for
two phones that had been advertised as free.8 The plaintiffs’ contract
of sale included a mandatory arbitration agreement with many provisions, including an agreement not to pursue remedies through classwide litigation or arbitration. In 2005, the plaintiffs filed a suit against
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 1, at 2002–04; Kessler, supra note 1, at 2945.
See Aragaki, supra note 1, at 2002–04.
See Kessler, supra note 1, at 2960–66.
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
Id. at 337.
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AT&T in federal court, which was later consolidated into a class action.9 In 2008, AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration under
the terms of the contract.10 The district court refused, holding that the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because, in part, the class
action waiver rendered the contract unconscionable under California’s
Discover Bank v. Superior Court11 rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.12 AT&T appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and, in 2011,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and essentially held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA.13
As David Horton, Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law,
noted: “The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as the primary
check on drafter overreaching” in consumer arbitration litigation.14
The other leading candidate for a check on drafter overreach is the
effective vindication rule, which has proven somewhat ineffective in
the hands of the current U.S. Supreme Court.15 As discussed infra,
other possible grounds to void arbitration decisions (e.g., void as to
public policy) have also not offered much protection in the area of
consumer arbitration.16
The outcome in Concepcion can be understood to be as much a
result of the long war against the class action in U.S. political circles as
it is a decision specific to federal arbitration law or federal preemption
9. See Class Action Complaint for: (1) Violation of California Code of Regulations Section
1585(b)(6); and (2) Violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et. seq.
at 2–5, Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (2005) (No. 05 CV 1167 JM (AJB)),
2005 WL 1802719.
10. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC’s
Motion To Compel Arbitration & To Dismiss Claims of Concepcion Plaintiffs Pursuant to the
Fed. Arbitration Act at 1, Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL
5216255 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 2073400.
11. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
12. See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *7–9; see Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849,
854 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108) (“[Discover Bank held] that class
action waivers were at least sometimes unconscionable under California law.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
13. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351–52.
14. Horton, supra note 2, at 388 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
lower courts can invoke unconscionability to invalidate one-sided arbitration provisions, and
dozens (perhaps hundreds) of judges have done exactly that.” (footnote omitted)); see AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1439–41, 1440 fig.1 (2008); Susan Randall, Judicial
Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185,
194–98 (2004).
15. The vindication of rights doctrine, which only applies to claims brought under federal law,
was significantly limited in the context of protecting class actions in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant (AMEX), 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
16. See infra Section III and accompanying text.
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law.17 Nevertheless, it is a decision rooted in a certain history concerning the FAA, and the logic behind Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion is noteworthy because of what it taught us about the hidden
assumptions in the current Court’s understanding of the substantive
law of arbitration’s sources.
The argument between Justice Scalia, who wrote the plurality opinion, and Justice Breyer, who wrote for the four-person dissent, begins
with each adopting a methodological position that is counterintuitive
based on where each wanted to end up.18 At the beginning of his
opinion, Justice Scalia took pains to reject the view that “the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was . . . to ‘ensure judicial enforcement
of privately made agreements to arbitrate.’”19 Instead, Justice Scalia
argued that “our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”20 Dissenting, Justice Breyer stressed
that, in earlier cases, the Court rejected the view that Congress’s “primary objective was to guarantee [arbitration’s] particular procedural
advantages” and emphasized that Congress passed the FAA to “‘ensur[e] judicial enforcement’ of arbitration agreements.”21
Justice Scalia’s position would have made more sense had he been
writing a decision that only enforced a class action waiver—that is, the
right to participate in litigation through a representative plaintiff. As
the American Antitrust Institute noted in its amicus brief filed on behalf of the respondents, class arbitration is almost always a superior
form of arbitration in consumer cases.22 Even in the specific case
presented before the Court, in which AT&T promised consumers a
one-way cost shifting of “reasonable” expenses and a minimum recovery of $7500 if they prevailed in arbitration, the economic case for any
attorney or claimholder who invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to prove the claim against AT&T was missing; thus, except for the
17. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375–77 (2005) (predicting and explaining that
arbitration waivers have the potential to erode class actions).
18. Therefore, I am not discussing Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which expressed his view
that except for a defect in contract formation (e.g., fraud, duress, or mutual mistake), Section 2
of the FAA preempts all other generally applicable state contract law. See Concepcion, 563 U.S.
at 352–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. See id. at 359 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1757–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Brief of Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3973888 (arguing that class arbitration may be the best
“available method[ ] for the fair and efficient adjudication of [consumers]’ controvers[ies].”
(quoting AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARB. 4(b)).
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most ministerial of errors, valid consumer claims would be left
unarbitrated.23
Although it is true that the plaintiffs, and many of their amici,
would have preferred a rule that preserved both the right to class litigation and class arbitration, Justice Breyer noted that the rule announced by the majority in Concepcion provided corporations with a
mechanism to avoid class arbitrations: “In general[,] agreements that
forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to
abandon their claims rather than to litigate.”24 Given this fact, the
majority opinion made no sense if, as Justice Scalia kept saying, the
point of the FAA was to promote arbitration.
On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s strategy in Concepcion appeared, at least on the surface, to embrace a perspective that was a
traditional bête noire for critics of mandatory consumer arbitration.
As Professor Hiro Aragaki has noted, the history of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has been an arc toward placing the
right to contract above all other competing values (what Aragaki calls
“the Contract Model”).25 In the first historical phase, referred to as
the “freedom of contract” phase, the Court “gradually disabled”
courts and legislatures from limiting what could be arbitrated or when
arbitration agreements were valid.26 This involved broadening the potential reach of arbitration into conduct exclusively regulated by federal (public) law27 and state (private) law.28 Aragaki argued that as
23. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337; see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using
Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable
Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (2004) (noting that arbitration clauses are designed
to prevent arbitration).
24. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The suppressive effect of the class
arbitration waiver on arbitration in consumer cases has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Myriam
Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 829 (2012) (arguing that AT&T’s
arbitration agreement and other similar bilateral arbitration agreements “appear designed to
give judges comfort that the claimant will be able to vindicate its rights, thereby enabling courts
to enforce those agreements”); David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85
U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 494 (2014) (reviewing the reasons leading up to the adoption of AT&T’s
class arbitration waiver).
25. Aragaki, supra note 1, at 1945 (“On this view, private ordering in dispute resolution was
not just one of many important objectives behind the statute; instead, it reflected Congress’s
overriding objective.”).
26. Id. at 1952–53.
27. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991); Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684–88 (1996); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
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the Contract Model evolved and strengthened, the Court endorsed
the idea that the FAA’s purpose was not only to allow parties to
choose which legal disputes were moved out of litigation but to allow
parties to choose the content of their arbitral procedures without any
interference from law outside of the FAA. He called this second stage
of the Court’s contractarian arbitration jurisprudence the “freedom of
contract procedure” phase.29
Aragaki’s claim that “[p]rior to [Concepcion], the Court had never
invoked the contract model to justify freedom of contract procedure”
may be dramatic; however, he is correct that the real issue in Concepcion was whether California could prohibit consumers selling, ex ante,
their right to participate in class arbitrations.30 It is true that until
Concepcion, there had been an understanding as to what the Court
meant in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees31 when it
said: “There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”32 It meant that the states could mandate certain rules of
procedure for arbitration unless they interfered with the FAA, in
which case they would be preempted under Section 2.33
Christopher Drahozal, Associate Dean at the University of Kansas
School of Law, noted that there are multiple ways to interpret the
meaning of “interference” in the context of state regulation of arbitral
processes.34 Although reasonable minds may differ on which interpretation should be the law, it is quite likely that until Concepcion, the
leading theory was some version of what Drahozal called “the RUAA
Theory,” which was based on the view of FAA preemption used by
the drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) in the
late 1990s.35
In Drahozal’s view, the RUAA Theory held that a state law, which
purported to regulate how arbitration was conducted, was preempted
29. Aragaki, supra note 1, at 1956.
30. See id. It would seem that some of the Court’s preemption decisions prior to 2011 straddled the line between substantive contract law and arbitral procedure. If it was not procedure,
what was at issue in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)?
31. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
32. Id. at 476.
33. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 416–18
(2004).
34. See id. at 417–20.
35. Id. at 417–18; Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues
Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 67–80 (providing a description of how the drafting committee of the RUAA “defin[ed] . . . the areas of the substantive law
of arbitration in which the states are free to regulate, the [FAA] notwithstanding”).
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if the state law conflicted with the arbitration agreement’s terms addressing “‘the most essential dimensions of the commercial arbitration process’—that is, that ‘go to the essence of the agreement to
arbitrate and the role of the judiciary in holding parties to those
agreements.’”36 Therefore, the key distinction was between procedural rules that affected the essence of arbitration as a process (which
were preempted) and that effected the process but were consistent
with it (which the states were free to design as they saw fit). Stephen
Hayford, the Academic Advisor to the drafters of the RUAA who
worked on this question, called the latter “procedural rules,” such as
“prehearing discovery, consolidation of claims, and arbitrator immunity.”37 In Hayford’s opinion, rules covering these issues of procedure
were even less likely to be deemed essential to arbitration than certain
other rules covering borderline issues, such as the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages, the standards for arbitrator disclosure
of conflicts of interest, the authority of the courts and arbitrators to
direct provisional remedies, and the right of parties to representation
by an attorney.38 In his opinion, neither the borderline rules nor the
procedural rules “[went] to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate
or effectuation of the results of the process.”39 For that reason, he
explained that when it came to procedural rules, the U.S. Supreme
Court should defer to the “state arbitration act, provided [its] rules
are intended to foster the arbitration process and do not conflict with
the seminal directive of the FAA that otherwise valid contractual
agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.”40
Aragaki’s claim that Concepcion marked the shift to the freedom of
contract procedure version of the contract model must be read against
the possibility that the RUAA Theory is still accepted by the Court. If
Aragaki is correct, then any valid contract-based agreement between
private parties concerning arbitral procedures would preempt any
conflicting state law and would only be limited by the FAA. As Hayford noted, the contract model put tremendous pressure on rules regarding so-called borderline issues.41 In Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.,42 the Court stated (in dicta) that a state law limiting the availability of punitive damages in arbitration would be pre36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Drahozal, supra note 33, at 417 (quoting Hayford, supra note 35, at 75).
Hayford, supra note 35, at 76.
See id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75–76.
514 U.S. 52 (1995).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL213.txt

694

unknown

Seq: 8

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

2-AUG-16

9:56

[Vol. 65:687

empted by a private arbitral agreement allowing an arbitrator in that
state to award punitive damages.43
Drahozal argued that decisions like Mastrobuono evidenced the validity of a FAA preemption theory that he called the “Pro-Contract
Theory.” According to the Pro-Contract Theory, any state law concerning arbitration is preempted if it conflicts with a provision in the
arbitration agreement.44 The Pro-Contract Theory removes the
state’s independent power to use its arbitration laws in ways that are
consistent with the FAA but in conflict with the choices of the parties
to the arbitration agreement.
The Pro-Contract Theory is similar to the RUAA Theory, only
broader. Under the Pro-Contract Theory, any state law that conflicts with a term in the parties’ arbitration agreement (by singling
out arbitration) is preempted. By comparison, under the RUAA
Theory, only state laws that conflict with a term “essential” to arbitration are preempted.45

Aragaki’s freedom of contract procedure and Drahozal’s Pro-Contract Theory are quite similar. Why did Justice Breyer who, in Concepcion, wanted to help California prevent parties from waiving their
right to class arbitration, begin with an argument that shared the same
premises as the contractarian arguments of those who would have
found that AT&T and the Concepcions could agree to any arbitration
procedure they wanted, including one that was only bilateral?
The easiest and most obvious answer is that Justice Breyer did not
have much choice. There is no statute of general application that prohibits the waiver of a consumer’s right to participate in any form of an
aggregate proceeding.46 The California Arbitration Act, like the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) that California did not adopt, does not
have many mandatory provisions beyond what is required by the
43. Id. at 58 (“[I]f contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages within the
issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its
terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.”); see 624
Art Holdings, LLC v. Berry-Hill Galleries, Inc., No. 6500452011, 2012 WL 10008044, at *16
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 7, 2012) (finding that “the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Mastrobuono
. . . implicitly preempted the Garrity rule” that state law can prohibit punitive damages in
arbitration).
44. Drahozal, supra note 33, at 419. Stephen Ware predicted the Court’s direction with regard
to punitive damages by one year. See Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1994).
45. Drahozal, supra note 33, at 419.
46. The plaintiffs in Concepcion argued that the waiver violated Section 1668 of the California
Civil Code. See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1668 (West 2011) (prohibiting contracts that are “against the
policy of the law”); see id. § 1670.5 (providing the remedies for an unconscionable contract or
contract clause).

R
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FAA.47 But, it does have a few. For example, arbitrators must conform to ethics standards established by the state,48 and, in effect, the
right to legal representation cannot be waived.49 Further, although
the California Arbitration Act has a provision on consolidation, its
requirements are able to be waived.50 So, the question of whether
California could prohibit class arbitration waivers within the power it
had under the RUAA Theory was moot.51
III.

PUBLIC POLICY

AS AN

ALTERNATIVE GROUND

Could Justice Breyer have looked to another ground, such as public
policy, to void the agreement between AT&T and the Concepcions?
Although it is true that public policy has been invoked to vacate arbitration awards,52 it is not obvious how this would have helped the
plaintiffs in Concepcion who wanted the court to dismiss a motion to
compel arbitration. Still, this may be a formalist distinction; after all,
47. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280–94.2 (West 2015); Richard Chernick, Witnesses in
Arbitration—California Arbitration Act, MEDIATE (Oct. 2015), http://www.mediate.com/articles/
ChernickRbl20151023.cfm (referring to Sections 1282.2, 1283.05, and 12831.1 of the California
Civil Procedure Code as part of the California Arbitration Act).
48. Id. § 1281.85(c) (“The ethics requirements and standards of this chapter are nonnegotiable
and shall not be waived.”).
49. See id. § 1282.4(a) (“A party to the arbitration has the right to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing in arbitration under this title. A waiver of this right may be
revoked; but if a party revokes that waiver, the other party is entitled to a reasonable continuance for the purpose of procuring an attorney.”). In other words, the right to be represented by
an attorney can always be revived by a consumer, subject to “fair notice” to the party on the
other side. The UAA flatly prohibits waiver of representation by an attorney. See Section
4(b)(4): “the right under . . . of a party to an agreement to arbitrate to be represented by a
lawyer at any proceeding or hearing” is a nonwaivable provision except in the context of labor
disputes. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4(b)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
50. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3.
51. Christopher Drahozal has suggested that Doctor’s Associates Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681 (1996), clearly settled this question. See Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After
Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 169 (2014) (suggesting that the FAA impliedly
preempted statutory prohibition of class arbitration waivers in Doctor’s Associates, which was
established “long before Concepcion.”).
However, it is not clear at all that a state law requiring the minimum notice to establish a valid
contract to arbitrate (a gateway issue) reveals very much about what Hayford called rules concerning borderline or procedural issues. Further, as Drahozal admitted: “Footnote 6 in the Concepcion opinion also raises questions about the reach of Doctor’s Associates.” Id. at 170. Others
have treated Justice Scalia’s footnote 6 less charitably. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted
Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 875 (2014) (describing footnote 6 as “a truly embarrassing moment
of judicial amnesia” and noting that the law at issue in Doctor’s Associates was almost identical
to “the hypothetical state disclosure law suggested [in footnote 6] as an acceptable policing alternative to Discover Bank’s unconscionability doctrine”).
52. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration
Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 597, 635 (2009).
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one can imagine a party asking a court to reject a motion under Section 4 to compel arbitration for the same reasons that it might ask a
court to vacate an award under Section 10.
One possible and easy response to the question posed supra is that
public policy’s role as a constraint on arbitration was severely reduced
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.53 Hall only concerned
whether parties could expand the Court’s ability to review an arbitration award under Section 10. The Court rejected the parties’ effort to
alter Section 10 by contract; interestingly, this position is in tension
with the Contract Model.54 But, that does not mean that public policy
has no role to play either in Section 10 or outside of it.55 As Alan Rau
of Texas Law has argued, it would be a mistake to extrapolate the
Court’s skeptical words regarding challenges based on “manifest disregard” to mean that law challenging violations of public policy is no
longer viable. “[N]o, no, clearly not: Since externalities—negative social effects—necessarily limit every exercise of contractual autonomy,
vacatur for violation of ‘public policy’ is . . . necessary . . . . However
rarely successful, it must somehow be made to fit within the architecture of our law of arbitration.”56 Post-Hall cases have confirmed
this.57
A public policy challenge to arbitration can be based on either federal or state law.58 The rationale behind it is that “no court will lend
its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal
act” and “that the public’s interests in confining the scope of private
agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the
judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers whether to
enforce such agreements.”59 Because it is the public’s interest that is
taken into consideration, not the interests of the parties to the contract, the measure of that interest must be based on “‘some explicit
public policy’ that is ‘well defined and dominant.’”60 The public pol53. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
54. See id. at 586.
55. See, e.g., Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110–11 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of Freedom, 17 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 501–02 (2006) (footnote omitted); see Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an
Error: Replacing “Manifest Disregard” with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Award,
60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d. 342, 351 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
58. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (evaluating the public policy exception based on federal law); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988
F.2d 1020, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993) (evaluating the public policy exception based on state law).
59. United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 42.
60. Id. at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
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icy is “ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’”61
The idea that, as a matter of public policy, courts will not enforce
private agreements that would weaken or undermine the enforcement
of state or federal law has been part of federal arbitration law since
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber Workers,62 in
which the Court held that an arbitration award that would violate Title VII cannot be enforced.63 In that case, the Court used the phrase
“legal precedents,” and, logically, this could include not only common
law precedent but even basic legal principles, like the rule of law, due
process, or fairness. This is illustrated in In re Brisman v. Hebrew
Academy of the Five Towns & Rockaway.64 In Brisman the court held
that because the award implemented by a religious court “set[ ] a precedent that will impact and limit the ability of private schools to make
and enforce routine employment decisions,” public policy required
the award to be set aside despite the two parties agreement to subject
this issue to arbitration by a religious court.65 In Kovacs v. Kovacs66
and Lang v. Levi,67 the courts stated that they would enforce arbitration agreements that deviated from Maryland’s Uniform Arbitration
Act as long as the parties agreed to the deviations and if those deviations did not violate “notions of basic fairness or due process.”68 In
61. Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766).
62. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 861 F.2d 665, 671–72 (11th
Cir. 1988) (holding that “public policy . . . prohibit[s] Delta from entering into . . . a contract” in
which it “agreed to submit to arbitration the question as to whether it should authorize operation of aircraft by pilots while they are drunk”); see also Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500
F.3d 1140, 1150–52 (10th Cir. 2007); Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1023.
64. 887 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 2008), rev’d 895 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 2010).
65. Id. at 419. See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1241, 1287–1303 (2011)
(arguing that the courts should “adopt a balancing approach” that accounts for “the central
institutional role played by religious arbitration”); Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration:
Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular
Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 441 (2006) (discussing the motivations for turning to religious
arbitration).
66. 633 A.2d 425 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
67. 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
68. See Lang, 16 A.3d at 990 (quoting Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 433). Although rare, there may be
circumstances in which fundamental religious doctrine conflicts with the state’s notions of basic
fairness or due process. At least one commentator has suggested that in religious arbitration,
this conflict should be resolved in favor of religion over state public policy. See Michael A.
Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J.
2994, 3014 (2015).
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Maryland, this principle has been repeated outside the context of religious arbitration.69
Public policy arguments against arbitration awards are indistinguishable from unconscionability arguments when they rely on
nonstatutory grounds. As Horton noted: “there is a razor-thin line
between substantive unconscionability and state public policy.”70 Certainly, no serious argument could be made that an arbitration agreement, which called for a coin flip to decide the legal issue in dispute, is
enforceable even if carefully negotiated between equals.71 It is not
clear why this is the case. In Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses,72
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the example of
a coin flip to illustrate the sort of contract that no person could reasonably be presumed to have consented to in an adhesion contract—
in other words, it suggested that a coin flip would render an arbitration contract void due to unconscionability.73 In a case in which two
parties agreed to settle a dispute with a coin toss, the court stated:
“Although coin tossing has been used to settle disputes for several
thousand years and, in fact, is still commonly practiced today, we cannot sanction its use as an ‘alternative dispute resolution’ method in
our courts of law (or equity) . . . [we] feel that it violates public policy.”74 Still, even if the use of a coin toss is the method agreed to by
contracting parties, other courts rationalize their refusal to enforce the
resolution of legal disputes by a coin toss on the ground that it is not a
form of arbitration intended by Congress.75
The reason that parties cannot contract for arbitration by coin toss
is the same regardless of whether it is labeled as an unconscionable
69. See, e.g., MCR of Am., Inc. v. Greene, 811 A.2d 331, 345 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (“A
court may ‘set aside an [arbitration] award where the proceedings lacked fundamental fairness.’ ”
(alteration in original) (quoting Parks v. Sombke, 732 A.2d 907, 911 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999))).
70. David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy,
101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1269 (2013).
71. “Nevertheless, I conclude that we must enforce the arbitration agreement according to its
terms. . . . I would call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge
would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.” Lapine Tech.
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), overruled by
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), as recognized
in Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
72. 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 759; see Collier v. Real Time Staffing Servs., Inc., No. 11 C 6209, 2012 WL 1204715,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2012); Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schs., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTLTAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
74. Kandalepas v. Economou, 547 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
75. See, e.g., Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the winner to receive an
award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the FAA.”).
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contract or a contract against public policy: the state wants to suppress
this specific private bargain and has the legal power to do so by withholding the aid of the courts to enforce that bargain. The substantive
values the state pursues may vary at a certain level of detail, but that
variation has nothing to do with which label the courts use to describe
the legal justification for the state’s pursuit of those values. For example, in the context of religious arbitration, the state will allow a wide
range of practices by religious tribunals but will draw the line at arbitrator selection controlled by only one party.76 As noted supra, the
basis for rejecting a contract in which the parties allowed unilateral
arbitration selection would be public policy (i.e., violating notions of
“basic fairness or due process”).77 The same contract term would be
rejected in a contract of adhesion on the grounds that it was an unconscionable term, and, therefore, the contract was void.78 Although in
the former case the contracting parties were in a nonconsumer relationship, and, in the latter case, the contracting parties were in an employment relationship, this does not explain why the regulation of the
contract term in the former case was under the court’s power to refuse
to enforce contracts that violate public policy, and the regulation of
the contract term in the latter case was grounded in contract law’s
unconscionability doctrine. Both legal theories seem to do exactly the
same thing.
In Concepcion, which dealt with consumer contracts, Justice Scalia
noticed the near equivalence of unconscionability and public policy
arguments. His opinion broadly swept across both. Justice Scalia explained why the Discover Bank rule was preempted, stating that the
rule was rooted in “California’s unconscionability doctrine and California’s [public] policy against exculpation.”79 Justice Scalia then
went on to treat these two rationales as identical in each of the examples he offered in his “parade of horribles.”80 Justice Scalia even
76. See Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review,
and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 189 (2007) (discussing the potential conflicts between
the FAA and the UAA with regard to selecting an arbitrator in religious arbitration). Another
example is the exclusion of witnesses based on gender and religious status. See Amanda M.
Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV. 157, 187
(2012).
77. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
an arbitration contract that “contain[ed] a provision that unilaterally assign[ed] one party . . . the
power to select the arbitrator whenever an employee [brought] a claim” was unconscionable).
79. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
80. Id. at 343.
An obvious illustration of this point would be a case finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide
for judicially monitored discovery. . . .

R
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reached back to the conventional history of the FAA to emphasize
that the Discover Bank rule was really nothing more than a reprise of
the early courts’ invocation of “public policy” to justify their hostility
to arbitration.81
California courts’ responses to Justice Scalia’s comments on public
policy are worth reviewing. In Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno
(Sonic I),82 the California Supreme Court held that an employer’s arbitration agreement, which required employees to waive the right to
participate in a nonbinding administrative hearing process created by
the California legislature to protect employees and assist them in recovering unpaid wages (the so-called “Berman hearing”) was against
public policy and unconscionable.83 After Concepcion, the court
partly reversed itself and held that Concepcion established that the
FAA preempted any public policy basis for prohibiting the waiver but
that the plaintiff could, under certain circumstances, still prove that
the waiver was unconscionable.84 The California Supreme Court conceded that Concepcion limited public policy arguments the same way
that it limited unconscionability arguments: “an administrative
scheme to effectuate state policies unrelated to the agreement’s enforceability” is preempted if it interferes with the “fundamental attribute[s] of arbitration.”85 It also held out the possibility that some
other aspects of the law establishing the Berman hearing, which were
also waived in the arbitration agreement, did not interfere with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration, yet they were so important that
their waiver was unconscionable.86
Other examples are easy to imagine. The same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules
of Evidence, or that disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps termed “a panel
of twelve lay arbitrators” to help avoid preemption).
Id. at 341–42
81. Id. “Such examples are not fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbitration that
prompted the FAA had manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring
arbitration against public policy.” Id. at 342 (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959)).
82. 247 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2001), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011).
83. Id. at 146, 152.
84. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic II), 311 P.3d 184, 192–94 (Cal. 2013).
85. Id. at 199–200.
86. See id. at 207.
Our unconscionability analysis does not pose an obstacle to the FAA’s objectives any
more than if the Legislature were to enact a statute requiring any dispute resolution
mechanism, including arbitration, used in lieu of the Berman procedures to have features that mitigate risks and costs for wage claimants, so long as those features do not
interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration.
Id.
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Justice Chin, who dissented in Sonic I and anticipated that the
court’s public policy argument would run afoul of FAA preemption,
dissented, in part, from the court’s efforts to save unconscionability by
making it about something other than California’s public policy with
regard to the role arbitration played in labor disputes.
In any event, I disagree with the majority that, so long as states
and their courts do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration, Concepcion allows them to invalidate arbitration agreements as unconscionable based on a policy judgment that the
arbitration procedure is not adequately affordable and accessible.
Under the majority’s narrow reading of Concepcion, the FAA’s savings clause permits states, for policy reasons, to impose all sorts of
arbitration procedures that are not within the terms of the parties’
arbitration agreement, so long as those procedures do not interfere
with fundamental attributes of arbitration.87

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Sonic II)88 illustrates why Justice Breyer threw his lot in with the Contract Model in Concepcion.
Just as Justice Chin characterized the Berman laws as an expression of
California’s policy goals relating to labor law, Justice Scalia characterized the Discover Bank rule as an expression of California’s “policy
preferences” with regard to consumer litigation. According to Justice
Scalia, the unconscionability rationale for the rule was that no consumer would knowingly agree to exculpate a company when making a
contract, but it is clear that he thought the true rationale for the rule
was the public policy goal of making it more likely that low-value
claims were pursued.89 This goal, he said, was not only unrelated to
the goals of arbitration, but it was inimical to them.90 Faced with
these series of hurdles, it is not surprising that Justice Breyer sought to
attack the class action waiver by claiming that it offended the FAA’s
“primary objective . . . to secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to
arbitrate.”91 An “agreement to arbitrate” is a contract, and, as such,
its validity as a contract is first and foremost a matter of general state
law. By invoking the FAA’s dependence on contract law outside of
87. Id. at 233 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second and fourth emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
88. 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013).
89. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 321 (2011). This conclusion is
strengthened by Justice Scalia’s characterization of his Concepcion opinion in American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (AMEX), 133 S. Ct 2304, 2307 (2013) (“[We] specifically rejected
the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip
through the legal system.’ ” (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351)).
90. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346 (“California’s Discover Bank rule similarly interferes with
arbitration.”).
91. See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
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itself, Justice Breyer was hoping that the California Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its own contract law might have earned the U.S. Supreme Court’s deference.
IV. STATE ARBITRATION PUBLIC POLICY
Claiming to love arbitration contracts so much that the contract between AT&T and the Concepcions needed to be voided due to its
formation was, in some way, a flawed strategy that carried many risks,
the chief among them being that it seemed obviously pretextual. Yet,
the alternate strategy—claiming that the contract between AT&T and
the Concepcions violated public policy—bore its own risks, particularly, as I described supra, that outside the very limited concerns of
basic fairness or due process, efforts to void arbitration contracts
based on public policy ran into the same preemption hurdle that
doomed the unconscionability argument in Concepcion.92
As suggested supra, Justice Scalia’s insistence in Concepcion that
the FAA’s goal was to promote arbitration was driven by a dynamic
that was unique to the facts of the case.93 If California contract law
held that, as a matter of general state contract law, consumer contracts
needed to preserve the possibility to aggregate litigation and the preservation of that possibility interfered with the “fundamental attributes
of arbitration,” then California contract law was preempted. This conclusion depended on identifying the fundamental attributes of arbitration and elevating those attributes above those contained in private
agreements and produced according to proconsumer contract principles. This is why Justice Scalia emphatically rejected any reading of
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd94 that gave priority to the “enforcement of private agreements” over the “encouragement of efficient and
speedy dispute resolution.”95 Justice Scalia was implying that if he
had to pick the fundamental attributes of arbitration, he would pick
efficient and speedy dispute resolution. But, in Concepcion, the Court
did not need to choose between efficient and speedy dispute resolution or the sanctity of private agreements because (according to Justice Scalia) the AT&T contract was a private agreement that already
promoted efficient and speedy dispute resolution. As Justice Scalia
observed: “In the present case, . . . those ‘two goals’ [identified in
Dean Witter] do not conflict” with each other.96
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra notes 70–91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221).
Id.

R
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What is not clear from Concepcion is whether Justice Scalia held a
Panglossian view that freedom of contract and the fundamental attributes of arbitration could never conflict. If the two ends were in conflict, how should that conflict be resolved? One answer is found in
Volt, in which the Court upheld contract terms that, like in Dean Witter, would have slowed down arbitration (by permitting a stay under
state law chosen by the parties). The Court held that as long as the
rules chosen by the parties did not “undermine the goals and policies
of the FAA,” the parties’ choice would be enforced, “even if the result
is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to
go forward.”97 In other words, freedom of contract consistent with
the fundamental attributes of arbitration was the overriding goal of
Congress. Parties have a large range of freedom in their choice of
arbitration rules, but their freedom is not boundless.98 Similar to
states, parties cannot contract in a way that interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration.
In practice, it is not clear how much of a constraint Volt places on
arbitration procedures. In Concepcion, Justice Scalia noted that the
parties had been free to sign a contract agreeing to arbitrate pursuant
to the Discover Bank rule, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation.”99 This suggests that parties are free to agree to arbitration procedures that, if
imposed by the state, would “interfere[ ] with arbitration.”100 Apparently, when private parties agree to allow class arbitration, to conduct
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, or to a discovery process that rivals litigation, they are agreeing not to interfere
with arbitration. According to Justice Scalia, when private parties mutually adopt measures that states are forbidden to impose, what
“[they] have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA,”101
yet it still constitutes arbitration as the term is used in the FAA.
97. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1989).
98. This seems inconsistent with the statement in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Services that parties “have complete freedom to contractually modify the arbitration process by
designing whatever procedures and systems they think will best meet their needs.” 341 F.3d 987,
1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis added).
99. See Concepcion, 563 U.S at 351.
100. See id. at 1750. This truly elevates form over substance. If the parties choose to allow
class arbitration, presumably that choice does not interfere with arbitration. But, if the parties
choose “the Discover Bank rule” by incorporating state contract doctrine into their agreement,
that does interfere with arbitration. See, e.g., Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190,
195 (Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he entire preemption analysis of Concepcion is based on a conflict or
inconsistency between the Discover Bank rule and the FAA.”), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
101. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL213.txt

704

unknown

Seq: 18

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

2-AUG-16

9:56

[Vol. 65:687

Leaving aside the fact that the term arbitration seemed to have a
core and penumbral meaning to Justice Scalia, his decision to champion the fundamental attributes of arbitration over, or at least to the
same degree as, the freedom of parties to choose their own arbitration
procedures must have had some limit. As the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit stated in Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC
v. Thione International, Inc.:102
The presence of an award does not by itself make a procedure “arbitration” if the procedures that produce the award bear no resemblance to classic arbitration. The parties could not contract for a
binding coin flip, with the winner to receive an award of his choice,
and expect the agreement to be enforced under the FAA.103

Arguably, cases like Advanced Bodycare Solutions map out the limit
beyond which parties’ choices will conflict with, and therefore be limited by, the FAA. Consequently, the doctrine of public policy will
then inform the “floor” beneath which no private contract can fall and
still be considered arbitration.
However, it is important to note that the norms entailed by the public policy doctrine will be thicker than what has been conceded by proarbitration forces if they are to ensure that the procedures chosen are
in fact arbitral. In both federal and state systems, the conventional
view of public policy is that it is “ascertained ‘by reference to the laws
and legal precedents.’”104 The conventional view is inadequate because the question posed is: What is arbitration? This question cannot
be answered by only looking to the text of the FAA and cases interpreting it.105 Moreover, Rau’s suggestion that “externalities—negative social effects—necessarily limit every exercise of contractual
autonomy” is also an unsatisfactory definition of public policy in this
context because the question to be answered depends on the meaning
of arbitration, not the effects it has on other spheres of social life.106
An adequate theory of public policy is available to the courts despite the fact that it must be constructed out of disparate cases that are
often seen in isolation from each other.107 The handful of cases assert102. 524 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 1239 n.3.
104. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983)).
105. This point is forcefully made in Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2855–57,
2864 (2015).
106. See Rau, supra note 56, at 501.
107. See Resnik, supra note 105, at 2810–11, for an example of how to do this using the
Constitution.

R
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ing limits based on “basic notions of fairness or due process” to religious arbitral process are connected to the handful of cases that assert,
without much analysis, that arbitral processes cannot consist of a coin
flip.108 It should not matter whether the material for developing this
theory comes out of cases finding the limit in the unconscionability
doctrine, public policy, or the definition of the term “arbitration.”109
Horton’s argument that Concepcion threatens the states’ power to
pursue their own public policy goals in the face of privately negotiated
arbitration contracts provides a strong foundation for a theory of public policy that can solve the dilemma that results when the two goals
set out in Dean Witter conflict.110 Horton argued that until Concepcion, states promoted public policy in numerous ways, including a version of: (1) the vindication of rights doctrine;111 (2) prohibiting
arbitration in child custody, foreclosure, and certain probate disputes;112 (3) the substantive unconscionability doctrine;113 and (4) the
refusal to permit class action and class arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts of adhesion.114 Horton has done the important and difficult
work of reviewing the theoretical commitments of the FAA’s original
advocates and drafters, and he has proven that when the FAA was
introduced, “there [was] compelling evidence that a reasonable member of Congress would have understood violation of public policy to
be a ‘ground[ ] . . . for the revocation of any contract.’”115
This Article complements Horton’s argument. It focuses on state
public policies different from those he identified, yet still share equal
legitimacy and deserve the same (if not more) deference by the courts.
In addition to having public policy interests in the enforcement of its

108. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant case law).
109. Drahozal argued that the ultimate backstop to an overbroad reading of FAA preemption
after Concepcion was the definition of the word “arbitration” itself: “The FAA itself does not
define ‘arbitration.’ But an essential element of ‘arbitration’ is that it must involve a decision by
a neutral decision maker. If a dispute resolution process does not specify a neutral decision
maker, it is not arbitration and the FAA does not apply.” Drahozal, supra note 51, at 172 (footnote omitted).
110. See Horton, supra note 70, at 1225, 1238–45.
111. Id. at 1233–34 (discussing Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003)
and Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999)).
112. Id. at 1234–35.
113. Id. at 1235–36.
114. Id. at 1236–37 (discussing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669
(Cal. 2000)).
115. See id. at 1255 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
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laws or the general welfare, a state may have a public policy about
arbitration itself. I call this “state arbitration public policy.”116
In one way, a state’s arbitration public policy is obvious—the UAA
is a testament to the states’ efforts to make choices about the way that
arbitration occurs within their borders. This approach has been considerably narrowed by the adoption of what Horton called the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “Total-Preemption Theory.”117 Like the Pro-Contract Theory, the Total-Preemption Theory posits that the “FAA forbids courts from annulling arbitration clauses to further state public
policy.”118 By comparison, under the RUAA Theory, “only state laws
that conflict with a term ‘essential’ to arbitration are preempted.”119
Moreover, a state’s own judgment about how to improve or promote
arbitration is not preempted, even if it annuls an arbitration clause
that has been freely negotiated and chosen by the parties, unless it
conflicts with an essential arbitration term. Further, the RUAA Theory notes that although a state’s view regarding an essential arbitration term is not superior to the FAA’s, a state can have a view about
the correct answer to that question, which it can express in its own
arbitration public policy.
A. Example I: Waiver of Representation
This Section provides an example of arbitration public policy at
work. As noted supra, the UAA, but not the FAA, prohibits waiver
of legal representation in arbitration.120 This has been inscribed in the
law of many states.121 There is no case law outside the context of
religious arbitrations that discusses whether a waiver of counsel in arbitration would be enforceable. Hayford called attorney representation a “borderline” issue, and he conceded that state arbitration law
116. This is not to say that there may not be a parallel approach, which could be called “federal arbitration public policy.” This is, in essence, what Resnik develops in Diffusing Disputes.
See Resnik, supra note 105.
117. See Horton, supra note 70, at 1224.
118. Id. at 1225.
119. Drahozal, supra note 33, at 419.
120. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.310 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3004 (2003);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-204 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-204 (2004); FLA. STAT.
§ 682.014 (2013); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4404 (2001). New York, which did not adopt the
UAA, forbids waiver of counsel. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7506(d) (McKinney 2013). This rule has been
confirmed in numerous New York court decisions. See, e.g., Marracino v. Alexander, 897
N.Y.S.2d 555, 558–59 (App. Div. 2010); Volpe v. Cortes, 792 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (App. Div. 2005);
Kahan v. Rosner, 889 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842–53 (Sup. Ct. 2009). As noted supra, California preserves the right to revoke a waiver of counsel in arbitration pending notice to the adverse party
coupled with an opportunity to postpone. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 2015);
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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prohibiting waivers of legal representation might be preempted by the
FAA.122 Assume a consumer contract included a waiver of legal representation. What possible purpose could the seller have had other
than to allow the seller to exculpate itself from its legal obligations by
making it difficult and worthless for the consumer to enforce her legal
rights?123 For this reason, a California court, even after Concepcion,
could follow Sonic II and hold that a consumer contract with a waiver
of legal representation was void because it was unconscionable. However, the more direct and obvious explanation for prohibiting this
waiver is that it conflicts with California public policy as expressed in
Section 1282.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Could this
argument survive the same sort of challenge raised by AT&T against
the Discover Bank rule? Imagine a seller arguing that the choice of
contract terms agreed to by both parties could not be regulated by
Section 1282.4 because Section 1282.4 is a state law that has a “disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.”124 The answer to this
argument is that—unless one adopts the Total-Preemption Theory—
the Concepcion Court did not simply say that all state laws solely affecting arbitration are preempted. As one California state court has
noted: “Concepcion outlaws discrimination in state policy that is unfavorable to arbitration.”125 It is hard to see how preserving the option
to have representation in arbitration is unfavorable to arbitration; in
fact, one might think that it is a public policy favorable to arbitration
based on the judgment that at least some parties (consumers) will be
better off preserving their option to have representation, notwithstanding their subjective beliefs to the contrary.

122. Hayford, supra note 35, at 75. Given that he wrote this in 2001, his anxiety was prescient.
123. This would be true even if the company also waived its right to legal representation. Its
employees may be lawyers or experienced arbitrators, which would allow the company to have
the benefit of repeat-player expertise while denying the same to the consumer. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Blurred Lines: Are Non-Attorneys Who Represent Parties in Arbitrations Involving
Statutory Claims Practicing Law?, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV. 921, 923 n.3, 923–24 (2015).
Also, while the seller might argue that the waiver of representation lowered costs for the
consumer by allowing claims against the seller to proceed without the delays and costs that
accompany legal representation, there is something deeply dishonest about this argument because it proves too much: on this logic, a complete waiver of rights could be upheld on the theory
that it, too, would reduce the costs of claiming for the consumer—to zero—with the result that
the consumer would have no possibility of recovery.
124. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011).
125. Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis
added); see Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mortensen,
772 F.3d at 1160).
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B. Example II: Waiver of Collateral Sources that
Pay for Representation
A further example provides a fuller illustration of why arbitration
public policy matters. Assuming that the state’s public policy interest
in arbitration extends to its power to prohibit waivers of representation, the question still remains how to identify the state’s public policy.
The previous example exploited the fact that the UAA (and, under
California law, Section 1282.4) was an explicit legislative command.
Conventional public policy analysis instructs courts to refuse to enforce contracts that interfere with the operation of a statute by either
securing a prospective waiver to seek the enforcement of the right or a
result that essentially negates the enforcement of the right.126 It is
important to note that the Court recognized public policy as a basis to
enforce an arbitration contract when it explained the origins of the
vindication of rights doctrine in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.127 Does it follow that since American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex)128 was decided, state arbitration public policy cannot extend to private contract terms that
interfere with the state’s interest in how arbitration should be conducted in the state?
Imagine that, after Concepcion, the State of California decides to
promote consumer arbitration. Its stated public policy is its concern
that low-value claims are not being brought in arbitration.129 Further,
assume that the California legislature explicitly states that it has concluded that consumer arbitration is superior to litigation, and, therefore, it wants to encourage consumer arbitration. To this end,
California proposes to subsidize individual consumer arbitration, and
the Arbitration Legal Aid Service (ALAS) is created. ALAS is
staffed by recent law school graduates who are supervised by experienced attorneys, and it is paid for by the state. Assuming that the
program is well run and that genuine consumer complaints are pursued, one could imagine that sellers would prefer the way things were
before ALAS because they now have to respond to, and potentially
compensate, tens of thousands of arbitration demands. Of course,
126. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
127. 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985). “The ‘effective vindication’ exception to which respondents
allude originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate,
on ‘public policy’ grounds, arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a prospective waiver of a
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.’ ” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. (Amex),
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637
n.19).
128. 133 S. Ct. 2304.
129. See Resnik, surpa note 105 at 2892–2915, for comprehensive evidence of this claim.
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sellers could turn to the political process to have ALAS defunded, but
imagine instead that companies began to insert an “ALAS waiver” in
consumer contracts of adhesion. Similar to the class action and arbitration waivers in Concepcion, the waiver would bind the consumer in
advance from accepting legal representation through ALAS. Would
these waivers be enforceable? This Article offers an answer to this
question: the waivers would be void because they violate California’s
“arbitration public policy.”
Still, Justice Scalia could have tried to answer this question by treating waivers that give up the right to use the ALAS program like the
waivers that gave up the right to use class arbitration in Concepcion.
As Justice Scalia said in Amex, the fact that a contractual waiver guarantees that an arbitration “is not worth the expense involved . . . does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”130
In the case of the ALAS waiver, the argument is less plausible because the likely purpose of the waiver is not just to ensure that the
consumer cannot minimize the expense of arbitration by turning to
private parties, like other claimants and the lawyers who represent
them but, instead, to interfere with a government program designed to
increase the number of arbitrations in California. Further, this example shows why Justice Scalia’s invocation of Concepcion in Amex
would have been quite problematic.131 Regardless of whether it is
true, as a matter of fact, that class arbitration is a deficient form of
arbitration, the collateral source payment of individual arbitration
cannot be credibly portrayed as being in tension with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.” The only thing ALAS does is lower the
cost of arbitrating a small value consumer claim by reducing the cost
of an individual arbitration to near zero. It does not lower the cost of
arbitrating a small value consumer claim by making it easier for lawyers to bring, and profit from, class arbitrations.
The ALAS example is designed to do two things. First, it is designed to illustrate how state arbitration public policy can provide
courts with a basis to challenge waivers in arbitration contracts that is
at least as good (if not superior) to attacks based on the unconscionability doctrine. Second, it is designed to amplify and extend Justice
Kagan’s dissent in Amex. Although she was discussing the effectivevindication rule, which is specific to the interpretation of federal statutes in coordination with the FAA, her point is equally applicable to
130. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.
131. Resnik, supra note 105, at 2875 (noting that Amex relied on a state preemption case to
decide a federal statutory rights case); see Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (“Truth to tell, our decision in
[Concepcion] all but resolves this case.”).
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state arbitration public policy: “The effective-vindication rule furthers
the [FAA]’s goals by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux,
method of dispute resolution.”132 The effective-vindication rule is not
just about protecting federal laws from outright attack through contract terms that prospectively waive the enforcement of those statutes,
it also implies a federal public policy that “prefers to litigation . . . arbitration, not de facto immunity.”133 That is why, in Amex,
Justice Kagan focused on the cumulative effect of all of the waivers
and conditions in the arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiff
restaurants and American Express. Her point was that federal public
policy says, at a minimum, that contracts that leave a party without
any “means of vindicating a meritorious claim” in arbitration cannot
be enforced.134 Although Justice Kagan disagreed with the factual
premise behind Justice Scalia’s claim that class arbitration interferes
with fundamental attributes of arbitration, her point was that the effective-vindication rule is grounded on a similar theory: the contract
drafted by American Express interfered with the FAA—assuming
that one of the FAA’s goals is the promotion of the arbitration of
federal statutory claims.
Justice Kagan’s argument in Amex brings the discussion of state arbitration public policy back to the question of whether the state can
have a substantive view about the best ways to organize and promote
arbitration. Of course it can. As I have argued, those views are not
toothless: they can be the grounds for voiding some private contracts.
But, Justice Scalia’s invocation of Concepcion in Amex is a reminder
that the Court wielded Dean Witter’s statement that the purpose of
the FAA was the “encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution”135 as a sword and a shield. In the context of an obstacle preemption argument against a state law whose purpose is unrelated to
the promotion of arbitration, this was a powerful weapon that was
devastating to California’s unconscionability doctrine as well as its
thinly veiled public policy promoting small value claims by consumers.
But, in a case in which the question is whether a law expressing California’s arbitration public policy is preempted, assertions like “individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribut[e]’ of
arbitration”136 must be tested against a competing theory of what arbi132. See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Resnik, supra note 105, at
2939 (explaining the need to ensure that arbitration remains a fair and equal method of dispute
resolution).
133. See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
135. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011).
136. Id. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1748).
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tration is and how it should work. California’s views regarding arbitration under the FAA, and arbitration in general, may not persuade a
determined U.S. Supreme Court intent on inscribing their idiosyncratic views about civil litigation into federal arbitration law, but it will
at least place the debate where it belongs and sharpen it.
V. APPLICATIONS
The most immediate consequence of taking state arbitration public
policy seriously and allowing it to have some weight in preemption
analysis is that waivers on the consolidation and assignment of consumer arbitration claims may be unenforceable in states expressing
the view that policies promoting consolidation and assignment of consumer claims are pro-arbitration.
A. Consolidation
As Justice Kagan noted, the contract at issue in Amex prohibited,
among other things, the consolidation of arbitration claims.137 California precedent holds that consolidation waivers may render a consumer contract of adhesion unconscionable, but, since Concepcion,
these holdings may be under pressure.138 Some consumer credit card
agreements prohibit consolidation of claims.139 The UAA specifically
mentions consolidation and describes the circumstances under which
an arbitrator can order consolidation; it also reserves the parties’ right
to waive consolidation.140 The question is whether a state can go beyond the UAA and prohibit waivers of consolidation in certain circumstances, such as consumer adhesion contracts.
This Section examines why a state might, based on one case from
Minnesota, take the public policy position that arbitration in certain
137. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
138. See Parada v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 759 (Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he Arbitration Panel paragraphs and No Consolidation paragraphs in the Atlas Account Agreements are
substantively unconscionable to a high degree.”). But see Trabert v. Consumer Portfolio Servs.,
Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 606 (Ct. App. 2015) (questioning the “continuing viability” of Parada
after Concepcion), vacated by 356 P.3d 778 (Cal. 2015). Horton suggested that the holding of
Amex left open the possibility that in cases involving state preemption (which was not at issue in
the case) “judges can nullify class arbitration waivers in stricter arbitration clauses: those that
include confidentiality provisions, bar joinder or consolidation of claims.” David Horton, Mass
Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 501 (2014).
139. See, e.g., AM. EXPRESS, CARD HOLDER AGREEMENT: PART 2 OF 2, at 5, https://web.aexpstatic.com/us/content/pdf/cardmember-agreements/green/AmericanExpressGreenCard.pdf;
NORDSTROM, CARD HOLDER AGREEMENT, http://about.nordstrom.com/nordstromfashionre
wards/pdf/agreement_12-31-09.pdf.
140. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:23B-10 (West 2003).
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cases requires the possibility of consolidation. In Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Glass Service Co.,141 the Minnesota Supreme Court
considered whether to uphold an order to consolidate 5,700 identical
“short pay” auto glass insurance claims brought by a single glass repair company.142 The insurer resisted the consolidation. The court
held that “some or all of the claims” could be joined into one proceeding subject to the discretion of the trial judge.143
The court recognized that there was a disagreement among courts
regarding whether consolidation can be ordered over a party’s objections if the arbitration agreement and the relevant law granting the
power to arbitrate did not explicitly allow for consolidation.144 Then,
as is still true now, federal courts took the position that the FAA does
not allow judges to order consolidation unless the parties explicitly
added that possibility into their contract.145 Despite this, the plaintiff
in Illinois Farmers Insurance argued that Minnesota law allowed
judges to order consolidation even if the contract was silent on the
issue.146
The court’s argument for interpreting the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (No-Fault Act)147 as allowing court-ordered
consolidation was based on Minnesota’s understanding of arbitration’s
purpose. The No-Fault Act is a detailed scheme intended to resolve
legal disputes concerning automobile torts covered by insurance as
quickly and efficiently as possible.148 The No-Fault Act incorporated,
141. 683 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2004).
142. Id. at 796. A “short pay” claim alleges that an auto insurer pays less for a service than its
fair market value based on a flawed reimbursement schedule. See Pete Brush, Auto Glass Vendors Top Insurers in Minn. High Court, LAW360 (July 17, 2009, 5:08 PM), http://www.law360
.com/articles/111997/auto-glass-vendors-top-insurers-in-minn-high-court.
143. Ill. Farmers Ins., 683 N.W.2d at 807.
144. Id. at 806. As noted supra, Section 10 of the UAA explicitly allows courts to order consolidation under certain circumstances. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also Ga.
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1367–68 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
(discussing consolidation under the Georgia Arbitration Code).
145. United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 256 n.104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (reviewing federal
circuit law), vacated sub nom. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Baesler
v. Cont’l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990). Under the FAA, the arbitrator may
order consolidation even if the arbitration agreement is silent on whether consolidation is permitted. See, e.g., Granite State Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. C 13-2924SI, 2013 WL
4482948, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013) (“[C]onsolidation is a procedural issue . . . for the
arbitrator to decide” (quoting Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F.3d 573,
581 (7th Cir. 2006))).
146. Ill. Farmers Ins., 683 N.W.2d at 805.
147. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41–.71 (2014).
148. Some of the Act’s purposes are “to speed the administration of justice, to ease the burden of litigation on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims arbitration to
decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation.” MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(4).
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by reference, the Minnesota No-Fault, Comprehensive, or Collisions
Damage Automobile Insurance Arbitration Rules (No-Fault
Rules).149 The No-Fault Act, the No-Fault Rules, and the Minnesota
UAA150 did not explicitly discuss consolidation; however, the court
found that these Minnesota laws were created to provide the citizens
of Minnesota with a “cost-effective, simplified, and informal alternative to litigation.”151 This assertion was not just rhetoric; it detailed
what substantive choices made by the parties were consistent with arbitration. For example, the court noted that this position clearly
placed Minnesota in conflict with the Eighth Circuit’s view of arbitration’s purpose (at least in federal law). The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the purpose of the FAA was to ensure that “agreements are enforced in accordance with their terms. Accordingly,
courts . . . seek to protect the right of the parties to receive their bargained-for dispute settlement mechanism, regardless of any inefficiencies that may result.”152 According to the Eighth Circuit, Minnesota’s
position was that “the overriding goal of [arbitration] to promote the
expeditious resolution of claims[,]” which is not necessarily the same
as enforcing the parties’ own choices about how their claims should be
arbitrated.153
Ironically, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s view was the same as
that adopted by Justice Scalia in Concepcion. In response to Justice
Breyer, who took the same position taken by the Eighth Circuit in
Baesler v. Continental Grain Co.,154 Justice Scalia argued that the
“point of . . . arbitration . . . is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”155 The type of dispute before
the court in Illinois Farmers Insurance was whether a “‘formulaic’
method of reimbursement” had been properly applied.156 The court
concluded that consolidation was the best way to promote arbitration,
which was confirmed by the trial judge on remand, and trial judges in
other cases involving the same industry.157
149. See generally AM. ARB. ASS’N, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT, COMPREHENSIVE, OR COLLISIONS
DAMAGE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ARBITRATION RULES (2012), https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show
PDF?doc=ADRSTG_022607.
150. MINN. STAT. §§ 572B.01–.31.
151. Ill. Farmers Ins., 683 N.W.2d at 806.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 806 n.3 (citing Baesler v. Cont’l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990)).
154. 900 F.2d 1193.
155. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
156. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 806 (Minn. 2004).
157. See, e.g., Alpine Glass, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 24 F. Supp. 3d 826, 829 (D.
Minn. 2014); Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., No. 09-3492 (PAM/JSM), 2010 WL
3521963, *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2010); Boulay Auto Glass, Inc. v. Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 27-CV-
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It is worth considering which features of the dispute made consolidation so appealing in a case with 5,700 individual claims. The trial
court found that: (1) there existed “common issues of law and fact
with respect to the disputed invoices”; (2)“[e]fficiencies with respect
to resolving the disputes . . . greatly weigh[ed] in favor of a consolidated arbitration, particularly given the formulaic manner in which
both the [parties] handle glass claims”; and (3) “[a]bsent consolidation, there [was] significant danger that separate arbitrations [would]
result in inconsistent results” and that “[t]he only way to avoid inconsistent results was to consolidate the invoices for consideration in one
proceeding.”158 The defendant in a related case argued against consolidation because it planned to raise individual defenses of fact (concerning the assignment of the policies), which, in its view, meant that
it was entitled to individual arbitrations. This argument was rejected
in subsequent cases based on the state’s expressed policy for the
“speedy resolution and diminished cost” of these arbitrated claims
and the court’s determination that the individual defenses could be
effectively heard in a consolidated proceeding with less risk of inconsistent results.159
What might Justice Scalia have said in response to Minnesota’s position on consolidation? One possibility would have been for him to say
that the plaintiff may have been correct. In a case in which there are
5,700 identical contracts and only one defendant and one plaintiff,
consolidation is pro-arbitration and any decision against consolidation
is anti-arbitration; however, that is not a matter of law for the courts
but, rather, only for the parties when they write their agreement. In
other, words, the law of arbitration gives the parties the power to decide whether consolidation in any particular case is required by the
law of arbitration. A second possible response would have been to
say that the law of arbitration gives the courts the power to decide
11-14139, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 249, *10 (Feb. 28, 2012); BuyRite Auto Glass, Inc. v. Ill.
Farmers Ins. Co., No. 06-4462 ADM/JSM, 2010 WL 145277, *1–2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2010); see
Boulay Auto Glass, Inc. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 27-CV-12-14646, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS
248, *9 (Dec. 12, 2012); Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Auto Club Ins. Corp., No. 27-CV-12-14616, 2012
Minn. Dist. LEXIS 247, *7–8 (Dec. 14, 2012); Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No.
27-CV-09-21397, 2009 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 360, *4–5 (Dec. 7, 2009); Star Windshield v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 27-CV-09-16898, 2009 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 361, *4–5 (Nov. 12, 2009); Glass
Serv. Co. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. A06-1074, 2007 WL 1815781, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26,
2007).
158. Glass Serv., 2007 WL 1815781, at *16.
159. See e.g., Alpine Glass, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 247, at *7–8 (“The parties’ claims and
defenses may be pursued and determined in one arbitration proceeding, which would improve
speed of review and decrease the danger of inconsistency. Distinct proceedings based on the
defense of assignment would arguably cause prejudice through added delay and expense.”).
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whether consolidation in any particular set of proposed arbitrations is
required, and that the Minnesota Supreme Court simply got it wrong:
like class arbitration, because consolidation tends to interfere with arbitration, consolidation is never required by a court as a matter of law.
In other words, consolidation “interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration.”160 The third possible response Justice Scalia may have
given is that the law of arbitration provides courts the power to decide
whether consolidation, in any particular set of proposed arbitrations is
required under Minnesota arbitration law, and although the Minnesota Supreme Court may have gotten that correct, under the FAA
arbitration law, consolidation interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and it is never required by a court as a matter of law.
It is difficult to see how Justice Scalia could have proposed the first
possible response discussed supra, given what he had said in Concepcion. Justice Scalia could not have endorsed a view that the drafters
of arbitration agreements can put anything they want in them, including requirements that would interfere with the fundamental attributes
of arbitration, for the same reason that the states cannot put anything
that would interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration
into their own laws.161
The second response would have traded on a superficial conflation
of class arbitration and consolidation. As Judge Easterbrook has observed, the two are not at all the same.162 The disadvantages of class
arbitration listed by Justice Scalia in Concepcion are absent when a
court orders consolidation. Consolidation certainly does not make the
“process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass” because consolidation does not require any proceedings over
certification regardless of whether the named parties are sufficiently
160. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
161. See supra notes 85–95. One cannot help but wonder if, as Justice Scalia asserted, class
arbitration interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration, the parties should be permitted to choose it.
162.
Class actions always have been treated as special. One self-selected plaintiff represents others, who are entitled to protection from the representative’s misconduct or
incompetence. Often this requires individual notice to class members, a procedure that
may be more complex and costly than the adjudication itself. As a practical matter the
representative’s small stake means that lawyers are in charge, which creates a further
need for the adjudicator to protect the class. Finally, class actions can turn a small
claim into a whopping one. . . . Consolidation of suits . . . poses none of these potential
problems.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. v. BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted); see also In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No. 12 CV 2656 (AJN), 2014 WL 2445756, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014).
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representative.163 Consolidation does not increase the risk of procedural formality by importing a Rule 23-like process because there is
no need for rules that can bind absent parties. Consolidation does not
affect absent parties.164 Finally, although consolidation “increases
risks” to defendants of a single large liability judgment,165 thus forcing
them to invest time and money in the proceeding, it is not clear why
this is a reason to disfavor consolidation, especially if, as the Minnesota courts have observed, consolidation benefits defendants and
plaintiffs by removing the risk of inconsistent judgments and reducing
the cost of dispute resolution for both sides.
As to the third response discussed supra, if it is true, as a matter of
fact, that consolidation and class arbitration are different and that
consolidation does not have features that interfere with arbitration in
general, then what could have been Justice Scalia’s third response either raises an irrelevant point or begs the question.
Minnesota could have its own arbitration law parallel to the FAA.
For example, state arbitration law relating to insurance is not preempted by the FAA.166 The absence of preemption is irrelevant to the
substantive claim made by the Minnesota Supreme Court: under some
circumstances, either party’s refusal to consolidate interferes with arbitration. The fact that the court expressed this view about arbitration
in a case in which its judgment was not subject to review by a federal
court through FAA preemption explains, as a contingent fact, why
courts in Minnesota have been able to develop a theory of arbitration
that elevates consolidation to a position of primacy. Nevertheless, it
does not lessen the validity of the theory for arbitration of similar,
formulaic claims outside the context of insurance.167 Therefore, the
third potential response turns on there being a difference between
Minnesota arbitration law and FAA arbitration law. In certain circumstances, this consolidation may be required to preserve the fundamental attributes of arbitration in the former but never in the latter.
163. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348; see also Underwood v. Palms Place1, LLC, No. 2:09-cv00700-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 1790463, at *5 (D. Nev. May 9, 2011).
164. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349; see also Underwood, 2011 WL 1790463, at *5
165. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
166. Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 254 (2004); see, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich
Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012).
167. The court based its analysis of the relationship between consolidation and arbitration on
a noninsurance case, Grover-Dimond Associates v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 211 N.W.2d 787
(Minn. 1973), which, in turn, relied on the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act—all of these are
sources, which, in theory, are subject to FAA preemption. See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv.
Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 805 (Minn. 2004).
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The claim that there is such a thing as Minnesota arbitration public
policy simply means that Minnesota has a view about what arbitration
means just as the members of the U.S. Supreme Court have views
about what arbitration means. So, hypothetically speaking, if the Minnesota legislature amended its state arbitration law to prohibit consolidation waivers in consumer arbitration, or if the Minnesota Supreme
Court announced that consolidation waivers in consumer arbitration
would be unenforceable unless the party seeking to enforce the waiver
made a showing that consolidated arbitration lacked the so-called
“Glass Service” factors,168 the Minnesota legislature or the Minnesota
Supreme Court simply prescribed a rule implied by the legal concept
of “arbitration” as that term is generally used. If, in the context of a
FAA preemption case, members of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed
with this interpretation, it would be incumbent on them to explain
why. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has the final word regarding the meaning of the FAA does not relieve it from the obligation to
give a reasoned explanation for why a competing interpretation by a
state legislature or a state court is not correct.169
Finally, it is also possible that the FAA could make a minimum set
of demands on the design of arbitration and that the states could impose additional demands—all in the name of improving or promoting
arbitration—as long as those additional demands do not interfere with
the essential or fundamental attributes of arbitration. An obvious example of this is the waiver of representation, which was discussed
supra. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to decide that the FAA
allows the waiver of representation by a consumer in an arbitration
contract of adhesion, a state could prohibit these waivers (either
through legislation concerning arbitration or judicial interpretation of
existing state arbitration) because the requirement that consumer contracts of adhesion preserve the option of having a lawyer present at an
arbitration hearing is the expression of the state’s views on the question of what is essential in arbitration. A state could take the same
view about consolidation waivers as well, even if the U.S. Supreme
Court were to take the view that the FAA allows the waiver of consolidation in an arbitration contract.

168. See generally Boulay Auto Glass, Inc. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 27-cv-12-14646, 2012
Minn. Dist. LEXIS 248, at *8–9 (Dec. 12, 2012) (describing the Glass Service factors).
169. As Justice Robert Jackson noted regarding the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: “We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring), superseded by statute 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2012), as recognized in Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2001).
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B. Assignment
States may have a public policy concerning assignment in arbitration. A state might think, for reasons similar to those discussed supra,
that in certain circumstances, waivers on the assignment of claims interfere with arbitration. Again, when Minnesota confronted the problem of how to promote the arbitration of auto glass insurance
disputes, it ran into defendants (insurers) who resisted arbitration by
one party—like the auto glass repair company in Illinois Farmers Insurance that had 5,700 identical claims—on the ground that the contracts, which provided for arbitration, prohibited the assignment of
the contract and, by extension, any claim for a remedy for breach of
that contract.170 The glass companies who sought to arbitrate
thousands of short-pay claims against the insurers had taken an assignment of the insured’s right to their insurance proceeds.171 In one
way, the question of whether to enforce the waiver of the right to
assign is even more difficult than the question faced by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Illinois Farmers Insurance because in that case, the
court was faced with the question of whether to enforce an explicit
waiver of a common law right.172
In Star Windshield Repair, Inc. v. Western National Insurance Co.,173
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the waiver was unenforceable.174 The court based its decision on its interpretation on Minnesota insurance law (finding that contract waivers regarding the
assignment of proceeds relating to auto glass repair were inconsistent
with the state’s statutory scheme for auto insurance), but the concept
of arbitration it employed was the same as the concept it used when it
held that courts could order consolidation in auto glass cases. It emphasized that Minnesota had chosen arbitration as the only way for
disputes over auto glass insurance payments to be resolved, and this
choice must entail free assignability for the arbitration scheme to operate.175 The court noted that forcing the insurer to preserve the in170. See Star Windshield Repair, Inc. v. W. Nat’l Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2009)
(discussing Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004)).
171. Id. at 347 (“In each case, an insured vehicle incurred windshield damage, and an auto
glass vendor repaired the windshield. The insured policyholder assigned his or her claim for
insurance proceeds to the auto glass vendor, which then billed the respective insurer directly.”).
172. In this respect, Star Windshield Repair, is more similar to Concepcion and Amex than
Illinois Farmers Insurance.
173. 768 N.W.2d 346.
174. Id. at 350, 350 n.6. The court carefully stressed that its holding only extended to the postloss assignment of proceeds and not to “pre-loss” assignments. Id. at 350 n.6; see Edgewood
Manor Apt. Homes LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 716, 737 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (citing
Star Windshield Repair, 768 N.W.2d at 350 n.6).
175. Star Windshield Repair, 768 N.W.2d at 350.
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sured’s right to assign the proceeds did not affect the insurer’s rights
in arbitration.176
As with consolidation, the fact that Minnesota’s public policy concerning arbitration and assignment was worked out in the context of
insurance arbitration, an area immune from federal preemption, is irrelevant to the point that I have been trying to make in this Section.
That is, in some circumstances, a state may come to the conclusion
that waivers of assignment in contracts undermine the state’s interest
in promoting arbitration. This could be true regardless of whether
that conclusion is ultimately subject to review for preemption under
the FAA. This point also does not depend on the fact that the principle articulated in Star Windshield Repair, that assignment may be so
important to an arbitration scheme that it cannot be waived by contract, arose in the specialized area of auto glass insurance claims; the
same principle was extended to claims of “short-pay” by medical insurers to medical providers.177
Although less frequent than waivers on consolidation, some consumer credit card agreements require waiver of the right to assign
one’s post loss claim.178 The argument for claiming that assignment
waivers are incompatible with a state’s arbitration public policy could
be modeled after the argument developed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in the auto glass insurance cases, although it could be based on
more basic policy considerations. Many state courts have stated that
there is a strong public policy favoring assignment except in limited
cases involving personal torts.179 Given that the ability to assign a
consumer claim is likely to be the only way for a consumer to secure
the value of the claim she has as a result of commercial wrongdoing,
and because it imposes no extra burden on the company, it is easy to

176. Id. at 350 n.6 (“Allowing auto glass vendors to arbitrate shortpay [sic] claims does not
increase the insurers’ risk of loss, and . . . does not affect the bargain struck between the insurer
and the insured.”).
177. Med. Scanning Consultants, PA v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. A10–2186, 2011 WL
2750708, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2011) (“While there is no similar statutory scheme for
medical services to insured persons, the auto glass repair case law is still analogous.”).
178. See, e.g., AM. EXPRESS, supra note 139.
179. See, e.g., Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003), overruled by Flour Corp. v. Superior Court, 354 P.3d 302, 304 (Cal. 2015). “The courts, of course,
have placed certain limits on nonassignment clauses-there is [a] strong policy in favor of the free
transferability of all types of property . . . and the prohibition, does not apply where all that
remains to do under the contract is the payment of money.” Thomas v. Thomas, 13 Cal. Rptr.
872, 877 (Ct. App. 1961) (citations omitted).
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see how a prohibition of assignment waivers would be required by a
state’s arbitration public policy.180
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article began with an assumption that arbitration means more
than outsourcing contract design to contracting parties—especially in
the context of contracts of adhesion and consumer transactions that
are of relatively small value. It suggested that the original architects
of the FAA—who were motivated by principles not mysterious to
us—would have wanted the U.S. Supreme Court to impose a substantive vision of arbitration that maximized the benefits of speedy and
efficient claim resolution for as many citizens as possible. Once we
recognize the need to develop a substantive theory of arbitration that
does more than enforce private agreements, the next obvious question
is whether the states can experiment with different interpretations of
the FAA’s theory of arbitration. This Article argued that they can,
within limits, and it set out some areas in which state arbitration public policy has been articulated, and could be articulated further, depending on how aggressively a state wishes to promote consumer
arbitration. The simple legal tools of consolidation and assignment
could help bring many more consumer claims into arbitration. If the
states choose to encourage their citizens to pick up these tools, the
U.S. Supreme Court should not allow their efforts to be thwarted by
the waivers designed to undermine arbitration itself.

180. Myriam Gilles and I proposed that, in the wake of Concepcion, “arbitration entrepreneurs” could purchase small claims and arbitrate them in a consolidated action. See Myriam
Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 456–57 (2012). Arbitration entrepreneurs could only operate in a world
without assignment and consolidation waivers.

